SEC v. Marcus Dukes by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-19-2011 
SEC v. Marcus Dukes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"SEC v. Marcus Dukes" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1407. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1407 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 1 
 
CLD-142        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1012 
 ___________ 
 
 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
  
 v. 
 
FINANCIAL WARFARE CLUB, INC. (MD); FINANCIAL WARFARE, INC.; 
FINANCIAL WARFARE CLUB, INC. (NV); COVENANT ECONET, INC.; MARCUS 
D. DUKES; TERESA HODGE 
 
MARCUS D. DUKES, 
   Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 02-7156) 
 District Judge:  Anita B. Brody 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)  
or Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 17, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES AND SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 19, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Marcus Dukes, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court‟s order denying his 
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motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will summarily affirm. 
This appeal is the latest step in a series of related cases involving Dukes.  Dukes 
co-founded the Financial Warfare Club and Covenant EcoNet, Inc., which sold 
memberships in a purported investment club to African-Americans.  The SEC and FBI 
investigated Dukes and ultimately instituted civil and criminal actions against him.  The 
criminal action proceeded first, and Dukes was convicted of mail fraud and money 
laundering and sentenced to 108 months‟ imprisonment.  Dukes‟s attempts to challenge 
the conviction on direct appeal and under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 were unsuccessful.   
At the conclusion of the criminal action, the SEC‟s civil action — which is the 
action now before us — resumed.  On January 11, 2008, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to the SEC on its claims that Dukes violated the antifraud and 
registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.  After a year of no activity in the case, Dukes began to challenge the District 
Court‟s order.  In May 2009, he filed a motion seeking discovery from the SEC, and in 
June 2009, he asked the District Court to reopen the time for him to appeal.  The District 
Court denied the motions in July 2009. 
At around this time, Dukes filed a separate civil-rights case under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against several attorneys and an 
accountant employed by the SEC.  Dukes claimed that the SEC had created a spreadsheet 
for the criminal prosecution cataloging Dukes‟s companies‟ financial transactions and 
violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by refusing to disclose 
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the spreadsheet to the prosecution or Dukes.  The District Court dismissed Dukes‟s 
complaint, and we affirmed, holding, inter alia, that “there was no Brady violation 
because the information Dukes claims the government withheld was known by and 
available to him.”  Dukes v. Pappas, No. 10-3380, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26371, at *5 
(3d Cir. Dec. 28, 2010).  We noted that while Dukes may have preferred to “work from 
the government‟s spreadsheet than from the raw financial information that he either 
already had or could have acquired with reasonable diligence, Brady does not require the 
government „to facilitate the compilation of exculpatory material that, with some 
industry, defense counsel could marshal on their own.‟” Id. at *6 (quoting United States 
v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 246 (5th Cir. 2002)). 
On July 18, 2010 (two days before the District Court dismissed his civil-rights 
complaint), Dukes filed a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) in the SEC‟s civil action.  
He claimed that the SEC had committed fraud by failing to turn over the spreadsheet that 
was the subject of his civil-rights action.  The District Court denied Dukes‟s motion, and 
he then initiated the instant appeal.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We construe Dukes‟s motion 
as seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6),1 and review the denial of the motion for abuse 
                                                 
1
  Rule 60(b) provides six grounds under which a litigant can obtain relief 
from a final judgment.  Dukes cannot seek relief under subsection (1), (2), or (3) because 
they are subject to a one-year time limitation, see Rule 60(c)(1), and he filed his Rule 
60(b) motion about two-and-a-half years after the District Court entered judgment.  
Further, because there is no basis to conclude that the judgment is void or that the 
judgment “is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated,” subsections 
(4) and (5) are likewise inapplicable. 
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of discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  As we 
have explained, “the Rule 60(b)(6) ground for relief from judgment provides for 
extraordinary relief and may only be invoked upon a showing of exceptional 
circumstances.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 840 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
Dukes‟s argument seems to be that because the SEC did not disclose the 
spreadsheet during the criminal action, the judgment in that case was founded on fraud, 
and the District Court therefore should not have accorded collateral-estoppel effect to that 
judgment in this case.  Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the existence of 
fraud in the underlying case can provide a defense to the assertion of issue preclusion, see 
In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 628 (3d Cir. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 
cmt. j, Dukes has not made the necessary showing here.  Dukes‟s argument depends on 
his assumption that the government was required to provide the spreadsheet to him in the 
criminal case.  However, as we held in his civil-rights case, because the spreadsheet was 
merely a summary of Dukes‟s own bank records, the government was not required to 
disclose it.  Dukes presents no other argument in support of his allegations of fraud, and 
accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
2
  See Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1170 (10th Cir. 
                                                 
2
  To the extent that Dukes is attempting to raise a fraud-on-the-court claim, 
the claim fails.  In Dukes‟s first Rule 60(b) motion, he complained generally that the 
government had engaged in fraud in the discovery process in the criminal case.  The 
government responded that those allegations were untrue, and the District Court denied 
the motion on the ground that discovery issues in the criminal case were irrelevant to the 
civil case.  Given our conclusion that the government was not obligated to disclose the 
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2000).   
There is an even more fundamental problem with Dukes‟s motion.  He claims that 
his newly discovered evidence shows that the SEC committed fraud.  He thus could have 
raised this claim under either Rule 60(b)(2) (allowing relief in cases of newly discovered 
evidence) or Rule 60(b)(3) (allowing relief in cases of fraud or misconduct by an 
opposing party); the availability of relief under those subsections renders subsection 
(b)(6) unavailable to him here.  See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 
U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (explaining that “clause (6) and clauses (1) through (5) are mutually 
exclusive”); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Dakota Cheese, 923 F.2d 
576, 577 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that motion based on newly discovered cannot be 
brought under Rule 60(b)(6)).  And, as noted above, see note 1, his motion was filed 
outside the one-year limitation period applicable to clauses (2) and (3).  
Accordingly, we conclude that there is no substantial question presented by this 
appeal, and will thus summarily affirm the District Court‟s order denying Dukes‟s Rule 
60(b)(6) motion.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
                                                                                                                                                             
spreadsheet during the criminal action, its failure to do so and its later defense do not 
amount to a fraud on the court.  See generally Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 
386-387 (3d Cir. 2005) (“a determination of fraud on the court may be justified only by 
the most egregious misconduct directed to the court itself” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 559-60 (2d Cir. 1988). 
